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*To inspire each student to
extraordinary achievement
every day!*

July 31, 2026

First Class Mail and Email

State Board of Education
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c/o Ric Reyes, Director
California Department of Education
Director, Charter Schools Division
1430 N Street
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**Re: Twin Rivers Unified School District Written Reply to Respondent's
Opposition Highlands Community Charter School Revocation Appeal**

Dear Members of the State Board of Education:

Pursuant to Title 5, Calif. Code of Regulations, section 11968.5.5 and direction from the California Department of Education Charter Schools Division dated July 20, 2026, please find enclosed with this letter the Twin Rivers Unified School District's ("District") written reply to the opposition submitted to the State Board of Education by Highlands Community Charter School ("HCCS") regarding the District's appeal of the Sacramento County Board of Education's decision to reverse the District Board of Trustee's revocation of HCCS' Charter.

We respectfully urge the State Board of Education to find that the District Board's decision to revoke HCCS' Charter was supported by substantial evidence, and that the Sacramento County Board of Education erred when it reversed the decision to revoke HCCS Charter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Tu Moua Carroz", is written over a blue circular stamp that contains the text "ED".

Dr. Tu Moua Carroz
Superintendent

Cc: Sacramento County Board of Education
(c/o Dr. David Gordon, Sacramento County Superintendent of Schools)
Highlands Community Charter and Technical Schools/ Highlands Community
Charter School

Enclosure: District Reply to HCCS Opposition

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**Twin Rivers Unified School District's Written Reply
to Respondent's Opposition to the District's Appeal of the
Sacramento County Board of Education's Reversal of the
Highlands Community Charter School Revocation**

Submitted July 31, 2026

A. Introduction

Pursuant to Title 5, California Code of Regulations, section 11968.5.5 ("Section 11968.5.5"), on June 18, 2026, the Twin Rivers Unified School District ("District" or "TRUSD") submitted its Notice of Appeal and written arguments, along with the Administrative Record in support of the appeal ("District Appeal"), to the California State Board of Education ("SBE") via the California Department of Education Charter Schools Division regarding the Sacramento County Board of Education's ("SCBOE") decision to reverse the District's revocation of the charter for Highlands Community Charter School ("HCCS").

On or about July 17, 2026, the CDE received HCCS' Opposition to the District Appeal ("HCCS Opposition"). The HCCS Opposition in footnote 2 on page 7 states: "SCOE's Analysis of HCCS and HCCS Charter Revocation Appeals was included in TRUSD's administrative record as to TRUSD's appeal of the reversal of the revocation for HCCS, but not for HCCS. HCCS has provided an augmented record with this *and other missing documents*, labeled HCCS AR 007372 – 007443."

The District already included the SCOE's Analysis with the Administrative Record ("AR") submitted with the Notice of Appeal (see HCCS AR 7166-7366.), so any cites by HCCS to that Analysis should be to the AR submitted by the District on appeal. As to the documents HCCS identifies as "missing documents" which it has enclosed with new AR numbers as part of its Opposition, it is similarly unclear why HCCS seeks to augment the record to include these documents. HCCS needs to either cite to the AR submitted with the District's appeal for any documents that are already included in the AR (which may include all of the records HCCS seeks to add), or the added documents should not be considered by SBE on appeal.

By correspondence to the District dated July 20, 2026, the CDE Charter Schools Division notified the District that it may submit a written reply to HCCS's written oppositions to the CDE by email at Charters@cde.ca.gov by 4:00 p.m. on August 3, 2026.

Pursuant to Section 11968.5.5 and direction from CDE Charter Schools Division, the District hereby submits its Reply to HCCS' Opposition and respectfully urges the SBE to find that the District Board's decision to revoke HCCS' Charter was supported by substantial evidence, and that SCBOE erred when it reversed the District Board's decision to revoke HCCS' Charter.

B. District Arguments

1. Standard of Review

Substantial Evidence is the appropriate standard of review applicable to this charter revocation reversal appeal. Education Code section 47607(i) provides:

(4) The state board may reverse the revocation decision if the state board determines that the findings made by the chartering authority under subdivision (h) are not supported by substantial evidence. The state board may uphold the revocation decision of the school district if the state board determines that the findings made by the chartering authority under subdivision (h) are supported by substantial evidence. (Emphasis added.)

In its Opposition HCCS asserts that the “scope of review defined by Education Code section 47607, subdivision (i)(4), does not apply” and the District “has no basis” for demanding that SBE review the evidence presented by the District to determine whether its decision was supported by substantial evidence. (See HCCS Opposition, p. 10.)

Instead HCCS asserts that “in reviewing this appeal, SBE must uphold the decision of SBCOE that reversed the revocation unless it finds that SCBOE abused its discretion.” (HCCS Opposition, p. 10.) This interpretation is misguided, not supported by applicable law, and inconsistent with Section 47607 on its face. Education Code section 47607(i) clearly provides that the SBE is guided by the deferential substantial evidence standard of review regarding this appeal.

2. District’s Revocation Decision was Supported by Substantial Evidence

The District Appeal (pp. 9-23) and cited Administrative Record documents demonstrate that the District’s decision to revoke HCCS’ Charter was supported by substantial evidence.

The District Board convened on January 30, 2026, to consider whether to approve the issuance of a Final Decision to Revoke HCCS’ Charter and unanimously approved issuance of a Final Decision to Revoke HCCS’s Charter effectively immediately. In support of its Final Decision to Revoke HCCS’ Charter, the Board adopted the findings of fact contained in the Notice of Intent to Revoke and its exhibits as its written factual findings, supported by substantial evidence specific to HCCS, and incorporated those findings into its approved Resolution as though set forth fully therein. In support of its decision to issue a Final Decision to Revoke HCCS’ Charter, the Board further found that:

(A) Substantial evidence demonstrates that the violations initially identified in the NOV, and demonstrated in the Notice of Intent to Revoke and exhibits thereto, and as further stated herein, have in fact occurred;

(B) HCCS failed to refute, remedy, or propose remedial action sufficient to remedy all of the violations identified in the NOV;

(C) The violations set forth in the NOV and Notice of Intent to Revoke, have not been sufficiently remedied by HCCS, and attempts at further corrective actions taken by HCCS, although considered by the Board, failed to sufficiently remedy the violations identified in the NOV and substantiated in the Notice of Intent to Revoke, and/or promised unsubstantiated and unreliable future performance and resulting uncertainty regarding future compliance

(HCCS AR 1236-1238.)

3. SBCOE Erred in its Decision to Reverse HCCS' Revocation

The SCBOE erred by finding that the District Board's revocation of HCCS' Charter was not supported by substantial evidence on the record that was presented to the SCBOE on appeal. Per operative Section 11968.5.5:

(c) At the same time the appellant submits its Notice of Appeal to the SBE, the appellant shall also submit to the SBE a written argument in the form of a brief or letter that shall be individually and sequentially numbered, one number per page; be delivered to the respondent within five calendar days of delivery to the SBE; and contain the following:

[...]

(2) a summary of the arguments in support of the appellant's position that the chartering authority and/or the county board of education erred in its decision;
and

[...]

(d) If the respondent chooses to submit a written opposition to the SBE, it must do so within 30 calendar days of the delivery of the appellant's written argument to the SBE. This written opposition shall be in the form of a brief or letter that shall be individually and sequentially numbered, one number per page; be delivered to the appellant within five calendar days of delivery to the SBE; and contain the following:

[...]

(2) a summary of the arguments in support of the respondent's position that the chartering authority and/or the county board of education did not err in its decision;

As stated in the District's Appeal, the record on appeal indicates that individual SCBOE members, who ultimately voted in favor of reversing the revocation, engaged in "second guessing" the District Board's decision by substituting their judgment for that of the District Board and/or reweighed the evidence in contravention of the substantial evidence standard. For example, one SCBOE Trustee seemingly ignores the guidance provided both verbally and in writing by the Sacramento County Office of Education's ("SCOE") General Counsel and the District regarding the applicable substantial evidence standard of review stating, "a reasonable person would definitely not take away the ability of Highlands to do their job." (HCCS AR 8421, Transcript p. 154:18-20.) Another SCBOE Trustee also appeared to ignore guidance, basing her decision on reasons beyond the limits of the substantial evidence standard of review, including her stated self-interest of not wanting to get in the way of innovation because she believes the Charter School is serving students that no one else is serving, and to give the Charter School another chance since it "seems like things are turning around." (HCCS AR 8417-8418, Transcript pp. 149:24-25, 150:1-25.)

Per Education Code section 47607 ("Section 47607"):

(i) (1) If a school district is the chartering authority and it revokes a charter pursuant to this section, the charter school may appeal the revocation to the county board of education within 30 days following the final decision of the chartering authority.

(2) The county board of education may reverse the revocation decision if the county board of education determines that the findings made by the chartering authority under subdivision (h) are not supported by substantial evidence. The school district may appeal the reversal to the state board. (Emphasis added.)

Contrary to Section 47607 and the interpretation of the substantial evidence legal standard by California courts, HCCS asserts that Section 47607(i)(2) “explicitly” empowers “the County Board to second guess the school district’s decision and make its own determination of whether the District’s decision was supported by substantial evidence on the record.” (Emphasis added.) (HCCS Opposition, p 12.)

As noted in the District Appeal and recognized by SCOE General Counsel and staff, and HCCS itself, substantial evidence is a deferential standard which required the SCBOE to “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the board’s findings and indulge all reasonable inferences in support thereof.” (*Hosford v. State Personnel Bd.* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 302, 307, quoting *Gubser v. Department of Employment* (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 240, 245.) As stated in SCOE’s Analysis presented to the SCBOE regarding HCCS’s appeal:

Under the substantial evidence standard, the County Board does not decide the appeal based upon whether it would have revoked the charter if it were in the place of the District under the same facts and circumstances. Rather, the County Board may only reverse it if it concludes that the revocation was not supported by substantial evidence. (Emphasis added.) (HCCS AR 8250, SCOE Analysis p. 18.)

This deferential substantial evidence standard was verbally recognized by SCBOE Trustee Fong during the May 19 meeting. (HCCS AR 8419-8420, Transcript pp. 151:20-153:5.)

Furthermore, SCOE in its Analysis also acknowledged and advised the SCBOE that:

The courts have recognized that an inherent part of the “substantial evidence” standard is the presumption in favor of the lower tribunal’s decision. In *Napa Valley Unified School District v. State Bd. of Education* (2025) 110 Cal. App.5th 609, 625 the court explained:

Under the substantial evidence test, our review begins and ends with a determination of whether there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the findings. We do not reweigh the evidence and are bound to indulge all presumptions and resolve all conflicts in favor of the administrative decision. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (Emphasis added.) (HCCS AR 8250-8251, SCOE Analysis pp. 18-19.)

See also SCOE General Counsel’s presentation to the SCBOE, describing the legal definition of “substantial evidence” (HCCS AR 8265, Slide 7); and HCCS Opposition, p. 10, stating, “the same presumption of deference inherent in the substantial evidence standard now applies to the decision of SCBOE for the purposes of this appeal. ... Under the substantial evidence test, SBE may not

reweigh the evidence. Instead, it “must indulge all presumptions and resolve all conflicts in favor of the administrative decision under appeal.” (Emphasis added.)

4. The SCBOE Did Adopt Findings in Support of its Decision

While HCCS asserts that Section 47607 does not require SCBOE’s decision to specify why it found that TRUSD’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence in support of its decision to reverse HCCS’ revocation (HCCS Opposition, p. 15), the SCBOE did adopt Resolution No. 26-17B by a vote of 4-3, with which it expressly adopted SCOE’s Analysis of the HCCS charter revocation appeal and found that the findings made by the District Board of Trustees to revoke the Highlands Community Charter School are not supported by substantial evidence. (See HCCS AR 8432-8433; HCCS Opposition, p. 13.)

By adopting SCOE’s Analysis, the SCBOE adopted the findings therein when making its decision to reverse the revocation. SCOE expressly states the following in its Analysis:

If the County Board finds that the District Board was not required to consider remedies implemented after the September 26, 2025 remedy deadline, **then the District Board’s January 30, 2026 revocation resolution, which was based on the November 4, 2025 Notice of Intent to Revoke, contained substantial evidence to support revocation.**

Alternatively, if the County Board determines that the District Board’s dissatisfaction with the Charter Schools’ remedies as of January 30, 2026 was not supported by substantial evidence in the appeal record, then it may overturn the District’s revocation decision if it also finds that the District Board was required to consider remedies implemented between the September 26 remedy deadline and its January 30, 2026 revocation decision.

(HCCS AR 8258.)

While the SCBOE, by adopting Resolution No. 26-17B, found that the District Board’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence, it did not find that the District Board was required to consider remedies implemented after the September 26 remedy period deadline.

As noted in the District’s Appeal, the failure of the SCBOE to make this finding was not for lack of being made aware of the issue. SCOE General Counsel clarified that this was the SCBOE’s decision to make. (HCCS AR 8410, Transcript, pp. 142:1-10.) Although the issue was brought up during discussion at the SCBOE May 19 meeting and it was recognized and acknowledged as something the SCBOE needed to decide, admittedly there was no consensus reflected in the verbal record of the May 19 hearing or in the written decision/Resolution. For example, one SCBOE Trustee expressed her confusion during the May 19 meeting about why the SCBOE was not coming to some consensus about the “fundamental issue” of whether an extension to attempt further remedial action past the remedy period deadline was required since the answer would impact the SCBOE’s consideration of the evidence. (HCCS AR 8409, Transcript p. 141:7-24.)

Since the SCBOE adopted SCOE Staff’s Analysis finding that the District Board’s decision to revoke HCCS’ Charter was supported by substantial evidence, the SCBOE could not reverse the District Board’s decision to revoke unless it also found that the District Board was required to

consider remedies implemented by the Charter School after the conclusion of the remedy period. The SCBOE did not make this finding.

5. The District Provided HCCS with a Reasonable Opportunity to Remedy

HCCS is operated and governed independently by Highlands Community Charter and Technical Schools ("HCCTS"), a California nonprofit public benefit corporation, and its Board of Directors.

Following multiple and varying requests for information and notices of concern over a twelve-month period, the District determined that HCCTS either failed to remedy multiple areas of concern despite its receipt of multiple information requests and notices of concern from the District or makes promises of future improvements without offering viable plans that either have been implemented or are capable of being implemented by HCCTS. As a result, and since the District viewed HCCS' material violations of the conditions, standards, or procedures of its Charter and MOU, violations of law, engagement in fiscal mismanagement, as grounds for revocation, the District determined that the point had been reached where it was necessary to initiate the first step in the formal revocation process, with the issuance of a Notice of Violation per Education Code section 47607 ("Section 47607") and Title 5, California Code of Regulations, section 11968.5.2 ("Section 11968.5.2").

The District issued the Notice of Violation on June 17, 2025, and provided HCCS over three months until September 26, 2025, to respond to the Notice of Violation.¹ Furthermore, HCCTS had knowledge of the underlying violations well before the Notice of Violation was issued. For all violations, HCCTS/HCCS had been aware of the issues for many months, and for some instances more than a year.

For example, corrective actions to address the credential misassignment violation had already been well under way before the Notice of Violation was issued. As to site locations, California Innovative Career Academy ("CICA") had approximately twenty (20) approved locations available, and HCCS had more than fifty (50) approved instructional locations available to choose from. (HCCS AR 1563-1564.) This provided both schools with numerous options that would allow them to start the school year in compliance with their Charter/MOU and applicable law without needing to secure any new facilities or leases and without the need for an approved material rev

Accordingly, the reasonableness of remedy period must be viewed with awareness and consideration of the substantial advance notice that HCCTS/HCCS had already received.

Likewise, HCCS had sufficient time to start the school year compliant with the approved grade levels. They were not required to start serving students in 1st and 2nd grade to cure the violation, the only action necessary was to discontinue serving the unapproved grades before the year started. This action did not require an approved material revision.

¹ HCCS baselessly asserts that TRUSD denied HCCS a reasonable opportunity to remedy by claiming that the documents HCCS submitted after 9/26/25 in support of its response to the Notice of Violation were untimely. (HCCS Opposition, p. 24.) TRUSD never represented that the documents submitted in response to the Notice of Violation were rejected as untimely and TRUSD received and thoroughly considered those supporting documents as part of its determination whether to move forward with the issuance of the Notice of Intent to Revoke.

For those violations that HCCTS asserts could not reasonably be corrected within the remedy period, Section 11968.5.2 expressly permitted HCCTS to submit proposed remedial actions. Such proposals only required HCCTS to identify the actions HCCS planned to take to address a specific violation and explain how the violation would be remedied. The only statements in HCCS' September 26 response to the Notice of Violation regarding future compliance were promises that compliance will somehow be achieved: *"This issue will be fully resolved once the TRUSD Board approves the submitted material revision. If the Board does not approve certain sites, Highlands will immediately limit operations to District-approved locations."* (HCCS AR 7716.) Such statements did not address significant questions related to the violations. In this instance a remedial plan should have, for example, provided a plan addressing how the lease agreements with the unapproved sites would be handled, actionable steps that would be taken, and/or some type of timeline outlining when compliance would be achieved. In order for the District to consider proposed remedial actions, HCCTS would have had to propose remedial actions.

HCCTS therefore cannot now assert that the District rejected proposed remedial plans or that the District improperly insisted that every violation be fully corrected within the remedy period. Instead, the fault lies with HCCTS' own decision not to utilize the options available under Section 11968.5.2. The record supports the conclusion that the District provided a reasonable opportunity to refute, remedy, or propose remedial actions consistent with the Statute.²

When viewed in its entirety, the record demonstrates that the remedy period was reasonable. HCCTS had advance notice of the violations, students were out of session during much of the remedy period, HCCTS had already taken steps toward compliance in several instances, and the Education Code expressly permitted the submission of proposed remedial actions for any violations that could not be fully resolved before the remedy period deadline.

6. The Existence of Third-Party Factors Did not Render the Remedy Period Unreasonable

HCCS asserts in its Opposition that the September 26, 2025, remedy deadline was unreasonable because certain violations depended on actions by third parties, including completion of the independent audit, execution of lease termination agreements, and the District's review of material revision requests. The existence of third-party factors, however, does not establish that the District failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to remedy the identified violations.

As acknowledged by HCCS in its Opposition, Section 11968.5.2 afforded HCCTS/HCCS the opportunity to submit a proposed remedial action specific to each alleged violation if it could not be fully corrected during the remedy period. (HCCS Opposition, pp. 15-16.) Since it seems that HCCTS determined that completion of the audit, execution of lease termination agreements, or

² Based on the findings and recommendation of District Staff, on November 4, 2025, the District's Board unanimously approved the issuance of the Notice of Intent to Revoke based upon its determination that HCCS failed to refute, take remedial action, or propose remedial action specific to each of the alleged violations constituting the following grounds for revocation: (1) HCCS committed a material violation of the conditions, standards, or procedures set forth in its Charter; (2) HCCS violated any law; and (3) HCCS engaged in fiscal mismanagement. (HCCS AR 1202-1234.) A summary of the District's November 4, 2025 evaluation of whether HCCS remedied the violations identified in the Notice of Violation is provided in SCOE's Analysis of the HCCS Charter Revocation Appeal. (HCCS AR 8240-8234, SCOE Analysis, pp. 8-11.)

approval of material revisions could not reasonably occur before the September 26, 2025, remedy period deadline, it could have submitted proposed remedial actions describing what HCCTS proposed to do to remedy the violation(s).

Instead, HCCTS elected to rely upon the future actions of third parties. It relied on its independent auditor to complete the audit, on landlords to execute lease termination agreements, and on the District to review and act upon material revision requests. While those actions may have required additional time, they did not preclude HCCTS from proposing a path to compliance as contemplated by Section 11968.5.2

Moreover, HCCTS' reliance on third party factors was in several instances the result of its own operational decisions. Both HCCS' and CICA's material revision requests were submitted at the same time. Both sought extensive amendments that substantially expanded and, in many respects, rewrote the approved charters. Given the scope of those requests, HCCTS knew, or reasonably should have known, that the District's review of the extensive charter changes proposed would require careful consideration and could not be completed on an expedited basis. Nevertheless, HCCTS continued to permit HCCS and CICA to operate outside the scope of their approved charters while awaiting discretionary approval of those requests.

Similarly, the violations involving unauthorized grade levels and unapproved locations were not dependent upon third-party action. HCCTS retained the authority to discontinue serving unapproved grades and to operate only at locations authorized under the existing respective charters/MOUs while any material revisions were pending. Rather than exercising those options, HCCTS chose to continue operating the two charter schools outside the terms of its approved charters.

Therefore, the reasonableness of the remedy period cannot be evaluated based on delays associated with actions outside the District's control or on compliance strategies selected by HCCTS. Consistent with Section 47607 and Section 11968.5.2, the District provided HCCS with a reasonable opportunity to remedy, refute, or propose remedial action specific to the violations. HCCTS' decision to rely on uncertain future actions by third parties, rather than utilizing the processes it had available to address those circumstances, does not render the remedy period unreasonable.

7. There Were No Procedural Deficiencies that Impacted HCCS' Ability to Remedy the Violations

In determining whether the District Board's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, the SCBOE was required to consider "whether an alleged procedural deficiency negatively impacted the charter school's ability to refute or remedy the alleged violation or the District's ability to comply with its procedural obligations or authorizing duties." (Calif. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 11968.5.4.)

The SCOE Analysis found that the District complied with all requirements of the revocation process and there were no procedural deficiencies that negatively impacted HCCS's ability to refute or remedy the alleged violations. (HCCS AR 8251, 8253, 8256, SCOE Analysis pp. 19, 21, 24.) The SCBOE adopted Resolution No. 26-17B by which it expressly adopted SCOE's Analysis of the HCCS charter revocation appeal, and there were no other findings made by the SCBOE to the contrary.

8. The District did not Grant an Extension to the Remedy Period Deadline

The District issued a Notice of Violation on June 17, 2025, which afforded HCCS until September 26, 2025 (over 3 months) to remedy the violations. Following review of the evidence submitted to the District in HCCS' Response to the Notice of Violation, District Staff determined that the violations had not been remedied.³ The District Board thereafter approved issuance of a Notice of Intent to Revoke on November 4, 2025. (HCCS AR 1202-1234.)

In accordance with Section 11968.5.2, the Notice of Intent to Revoke was not issued until after the District determined HCCS failed to successfully remedy the violations within the reasonable time period it was allotted to do so.

Although HCCTS submitted additional materials between September 26, 2025 and January 9, 2026, after expiration of the remedy period, which HCCTS/HCCS asserted are additional remedial actions the District was obligated to consider, the relevant inquiry is whether the violations were remedied by the expiration of the established remedy period (See Section 11968.5.2).⁴

As was asserted in the District Appeal, if a chartering authority were required to consider every action taken in response to a Notice of Violation after the expiration of the remedy period, it would essentially force the chartering authority to restart the process, and a charter school could prevent revocation indefinitely by producing new evidence or arguments during the post-remedy period deadline and then insist that the authorizer may not evaluate them without restarting revocation proceeding. This untenable option was suggested by a SCBOE Trustee during the SCBOE meeting on May 19, 2026. (HCCS AR 7331.) Nothing in Section 47607 or Section 11968.5.2, requires such a result or process.

SCOE's Analysis recognized that the Education Code and regulations do not include a requirement to allow remedies after the close of the remedy period and "While District staff recommended accepting the post deadline remedies, the District Board was not required to accept this recommendation." (HCCS AR 8254, SCOE Analysis p. 22.) During the May 19 meeting SCOE's General Counsel explained to the SCBOE that the statute did not require the District Board to give more time to remedy beyond expiration of the remedy period. (HCCS AR 8392, Transcript p. 124:19-24; See also SCOE presentation, HCCS AR 8266, Slide 8.)

Even if the District were required to consider actions taken by HCCTS after the September 26, 2025, remedy period deadline, these actions largely consisted of revised plans, evolving explanations, and assurances of future compliance, but did not demonstrate that the violations had actually been remedied.

Applicable law does not provide a standard through which the success of remedial actions should be judged nor did it require the District Board to consider remedial efforts taken after the reasonable opportunity to remedy period expired. Across multiple violations, the evidence reflects a consistent pattern: HCCS acknowledged noncompliance, proposed plans contingent on future

³ District Staff found that only one of the violations in the Notice of Violation (the one regarding credential requirements) had been remedied.

⁴ SCOE's own BP 2400 cited by HCCS in its appeal of its revocation to the SCBOE and in its Opposition concurs with this conclusion stating: **"Substantial evidence," within the meaning of Education Code section 47607, shall be evidence that: [...] Was not cured by the charter school during its reasonable opportunity to remedy the violation.** (Emphasis added.) (HCCS AR 8192.)

approvals or future actions, and, in several instances, continued the very conduct that gave rise to the violations. While District Staff, in some instances, recommended that progress toward compliance could support a determination that the violation was remedied, the District Board, consistent with its statutory authority, determined that actual, demonstrable remediation had not been achieved.

C. Conclusion

The record before the SCBOE and now on appeal to the SBE contains substantial evidence supporting the District's findings in support of HCCS' revocation. For each violation, there is substantial evidence on the record that HCCS violated the law, its Charter/MOU, or engaged in fiscal mismanagement, and failed to remedy those violations within the required remedy period (June 17, 2025 – September 26, 2025). In multiple instances, HCCS continued to operate out of compliance, failed to provide required documentation, and relied on assurances of future compliance without a sufficient proposed remedial action to address the violations.

The District Board properly concluded that based upon substantial evidence HCCS violated the law, its Charter/MOU, and engaged in fiscal mismanagement, and that HCCS failed to refute, remedy, or propose remedial action sufficient to remedy all of the violations identified in the Notice of Violation.

Therefore, the District respectfully urges the SBE to find that the District Board's decision to revoke HCCS' Charter was supported by substantial evidence, and that SCBOE erred when it reversed the District Board's decision to revoke HCCS' Charter.
